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Laterza: Hearsay Exceptions in Accusatory Instruments

“THAT’S WHAT SHE SAID”: AN EVALUATION OF
WHETHER HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE PERMITTED
IN ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS
Andrea Laterza *
I.

INTRODUCTION

An accusatory instrument is a criminal complaint that charges
a defendant with a crime. 1 The complaining witness usually attests to
the incident by signing a supporting deposition, a firsthand narrative
of the crime, which is attached to the accusatory instrument. 2 In some
instances where the complainant chooses not to sign a supporting
deposition, Assistant District Attorneys (hereinafter “ADA”) and
police officers, who were not present during the incident, sign
supporting depositions in lieu of the complainant’s supporting
deposition. 3 The ADA and officer’s supporting depositions in those
cases, however, are hearsay because they are not based on personal
knowledge, but are instead based on information relayed to them

*Juris
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University, B.A., cum laude, Psychology. I would like to thank the Nassau County Legal Aid
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Professor Michelle Zakarin, Esq. for their advice and hard work throughout the editing
process.
1 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978) (“The accusatory part of each such
instrument must designate the offense or offenses charged.”).
2 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.20 (McKinney 1972) (“A supporting deposition is a written
instrument accompanying or filed in connection with an information, a simplified information,
a misdemeanor complaint or a felony complaint, subscribed and verified by a person other
than the complainant of such accusatory instrument, and containing factual allegations of an
evidentiary character, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief,
which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge
or charges contained therein.”).
3 See People v. Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002); People
v. Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cty. 2002); People v. Swinger, 689
N.Y.S.2d 336, 341 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998).
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through the complainant. 4 New York’s Criminal Procedure Law
(hereinafter “CPL”) states that accusatory instruments must not
contain any hearsay allegations, 5 or the claims they allege will be
dismissed for facial insufficiency. 6 Despite the obvious violation of
the hearsay rule, New York trial courts have found these accusatory
instruments to be facially sufficient based on hearsay exceptions, such
as excited utterances and present sense impressions. 7
In People v. Solomon, 8 a police officer and an ADA each filed
supporting depositions stating the complaining witness told the officer,
“while speaking loudly and talking fast,” that the defendant hit her. 9
The Kings County Criminal Court held that this behavior constituted
an excited utterance 10 because the statement was made shortly after the
incident while the complainant was still visibly upset. 11 The court
permitted the use of the accusatory instrument, holding that the excited
utterance hearsay exception is applicable to the affidavits. 12 Thus, the
court found that the accusatory instrument, which did not contain a
deposition from the actual victim, was facially sufficient even though
it contained only hearsay allegations. 13 In order to justify its position,

4

See People v. Giarraputo, 949 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853 (Crim. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2012)
(defining hearsay as “testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows
personally, but what others have said and is therefore dependent on the credibility of someone
other than the witness.”) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999)).
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, or a count
thereof, is sufficient on its face when . . . [n]on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the
offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.”).
6 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35(1)(a) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, a simplified
information, a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint, or a count thereof, is
defective within the meaning of paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 170.30 when: (a)
It is not sufficient on its face pursuant to the requirements of section 100.40.”).
7 See People v. Valentine, 2011 WL 5007959 at *4 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2011) (“[A]n
excited utterance made by a complaint to a police officer/deponent, may serve in lieu of a
supporting deposition, as the vehicle by which to convert a complaint into an information.”).
8 2002 WL 32157170 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002).
9 Id. at *1.
10 Id. at *3 (“[A]n excited utterance is a spontaneous declaration, made contemporaneously
or immediately after a startling event, which asserts the circumstances of that occasion as
observed by the declarant.”); see discussion infra Section III.
11 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *4.
12 Id. at *3; see also People v. Vickers, 2007 WL 2982004, at *4 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty.
2007) (“[T]he complainant’s statements to Officer Beierle constitute excited utterances. As
such, they can be used in lieu of a supporting deposition to convert the docket to an
information.”).
13 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3.
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the court cited to People v. Foster 14 and People v. Swinger. 15 In both
of those cases, the trial court held that the accusatory instrument was
facially sufficient based on excited utterances. 16 The court reasoned,
where hearsay exceptions would be permitted at trial, they should also
be permitted in the accusatory instrument because there is a lower
standard of proof in determining the viability of an accusatory
instrument, as opposed to the state’s trial burden. 17 The Solomon
court’s holding, as well as the other courts’ holdings, disregards the
statutory requirements of the CPL. 18
A recent decision in Nassau County, People v. Rasoully,19
addressed the issue of whether a supporting deposition, containing
only hearsay exceptions, may serve as a basis to corroborate the
complaint. 20 In this case, an ADA and the responding officer each
signed a supporting deposition because the alleged victim refused to
sign one. 21 The ADA’s deposition recounted the 911 call allegedly
made by the victim. 22 The prosecution argued that the contents of the
call constituted an excited utterance and a present sense impression,
which should be permitted in the accusatory instrument based on the
holding in Solomon. 23 The court, however, rejected the prosecution’s
argument, and recognized that the ADA’s deposition, which contained
a third-party’s description of recording, lacked authentication and was
based entirely on inadmissible hearsay. 24 While the court did not
permit the ADA’s supporting deposition, it found that the officer’s
deposition was based not upon hearsay, but upon factual, personal
knowledge. 25 The court found that the accusatory instrument was
facially sufficient because the officer stated in his deposition that he

14

740 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2002); see discussion infra Section III.
689 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998); see discussion infra Section III.
16 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3.
17 Id. at *2.
18 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972) (“An information, or a count
thereof, is sufficient on its face when . . . [n]on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the
information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the
offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.”).
19 People v. Rasoully, 2016 WL 4767430 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2016).
20 Id. at *1.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *2.
23 Id.
24 Rasoully, 2016 WL 4767430 at *2.
25 Id. at *3.
15
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observed an upset woman with an injury on her face and the defendant
admitted to him that he hit her. 26
In contrast to Rasoully, another Nassau County decision,
People v. Rizzo, 27 not only rejected hearsay in the accusatory
instrument but also held that “details relayed through [an] [o]fficer []
are not properly considered in ruling on the sufficiency of the
accusatory instrument.” 28 The court reasoned that hearsay exceptions,
alone, could never make an accusatory instrument facially sufficient
because, besides the hearsay, the accusatory instrument lacks “any
meaningful facts.” 29
The issue of whether hearsay exceptions in an accusatory
instrument may serve as a valid replacement for a complainant’s
supporting deposition has not yet gone to an appellate court in New
York. 30 This Note argues that hearsay exceptions, specifically excited
utterances and present sense impressions, should not be permitted to
corroborate a complaint in lieu of a complaining witness’s supporting
deposition because it is a clear violation of the CPL, 31 and constitutes
unfair prosecution, in that a defendant may be charged based solely on
hearsay exceptions, instead of concrete facts. 32
This Note will be divided into six sections. Section II will
examine accusatory instruments and their function. Section III will
discuss hearsay, the hearsay exceptions used by the District Attorney’s
Office in accusatory instruments, and the reliability 33 of these hearsay

26

Id. at *2-3 (“[T]he allegations of Officer Re, which are based upon his first-hand
observations and personal knowledge, contain sufficient non-hearsay allegations which
‘establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission
thereof.’”) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1) (McKinney 1972)).
27 735 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2001).
28 Id. at 919.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3.
31 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978) (“The factual part of [an
accusatory] instrument must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an
evidentiary character . . . supported by non-hearsay allegations.”).
32 See infra notes 48, 68, 71 and accompanying text.
33 See generally Lucy S. McGough, Hearing and Believing Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 485 (1999); Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, (1997); Stanley A. Goldman,
Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a “Firmly Rooted”‘ Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1990). See also Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 95 (1987) (arguing that evidence stemming from an
officer is inherently unreliable due to the police’s natural animosity toward criminal
defendants).
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exceptions. Section IV will analyze the Confrontation Clause and will
address whether hearsay in an accusatory instrument violates a
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront “the
witnesses against him.” 34 Specifically, this section argues that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment should extend to the
pleading stage because there is a strong probability that these cases
may never go to trial. 35 In addition, this section will address whether
the accused can confront his or her accuser if the complaining witness
never comes forward and he or she is prosecuted based entirely on
hearsay. Section V will discuss how defense attorneys should handle
these types of cases, specifically that they need to address the pleading
defect in a motion or on the record. This section will also propose a
solution to the court, mainly that hearsay exceptions should only be
permitted in accusatory instruments if there is sufficient corroborating
evidence and if the witness is unavailable. Also, this section will
suggest that non-testifying hearsay declarants should be able to be
impeached by prior inconsistent statements. Lastly, Section VI will
summarize why permitting hearsay in accusatory instruments should
not be permitted.
II.

ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS

The purpose of an accusatory instrument is to “provide a
defendant with fair notice of the charges against him or her, and of the
manner, time, and place of the conduct underlying the accusations
. . . .” 36 This notice gives the defendant the opportunity to prepare his
or her defense. 37
There are two parts to an accusatory instrument, the accusatory
part and the factual part. 38 The accusatory part must state the crime
with which the defendant is being charged. 39 The factual part must
allege “facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to
support the charges.” 40
34

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(March 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-afterrulings-on-plea-deals.html (“94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains.”).
36 People v. Atta, 5 N.Y.S.3d 455, 457 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015).
37 Id.
38 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978).
39 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(2) (McKinney 1978).
40 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978).
35
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A. Requirements for Facial Sufficiency
An accusatory instrument is insufficient if it contains only
hearsay allegations in establishing any and all elements of the offense
charged. 41 The accusatory instrument must be dismissed if it is
uncertain whether it is based upon hearsay or direct knowledge. 42 The
“required non-hearsay evidentiary allegations [must be] within ‘the
four corners of the instrument itself.’” 43 When a witness’s deposition
is based on what someone else told him instead of being based on what
he or she witnessed, the information stems entirely from hearsay,
which renders it defective. 44 The New York Court of Appeals has
repeatedly held that conclusory allegations, such as drawing inferences
from hearsay, will not suffice as a substitute for evidentiary facts.45
Hearsay is explicitly prohibited in accusatory instruments; 46 therefore,
it is inexcusable for any court to permit hearsay allegations in place of
“facts of an evidentiary character.” 47
B. Legislative Intent
The CPL requires factual evidence and forbids hearsay in the
accusatory instrument because, without those safeguards, the People
could prosecute anyone based on unfounded and groundless
allegations. 48 The requirements for the factual portion of the
accusatory instrument are strict and straightforward. 49 The reason for
requiring factual proof is evident when understanding the function of
an accusatory instrument as laid out in the CPL. 50 The prosecution
must make out a prima facie case in the information, the formal written
41

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
100.15(3) (McKinney 1978); People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71, 72 (N.Y. 1987).
42 People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 237 (N.Y. 2000) (“[B]ecause it cannot be determined
upon the face of the information whether the pleading is in compliance with [the non-hearsay
requirement of the CPL], the information is subject to a motion to dismiss.”).
43 People v. Thomas, 824 N.E.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting Preiser, Practice
Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 11A).
44 People v. Krimitsos, 831 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2006).
45 People v. Dreyden, 931 N.E.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. 2010), People v. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d 686,
686-87 (N.Y. 1986).
46 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972).
47 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15(3) (McKinney 1978).
48 People v. Monero, 712 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2000).
49 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.15 (McKinney 1978) (stating the requirements for the
factual portion of the accusatory instrument).
50 Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d at 73.
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accusation charging a defendant with a crime, because it is the sole
instrument needed to prosecute someone for a misdemeanor. 51 Thus,
aside from the misdemeanor complaint, the prosecution does not need
to present any other factual evidence before trial, if the case even goes
to trial. 52
The non-hearsay “requirement is not merely a formalistic
technicality,” but is rooted in “fairness and due process.” 53 Every
defendant has the right to be prosecuted by a valid information
regardless of how heinous the charges against him or her are. 54 It is
vital for the actual victim to sign a supporting deposition because it
shows “that a real person actually complained to the police and had an
opportunity to review the accuracy of the factual allegations drafted by
the prosecutor.” 55 The legislators foresaw this potential abuse of
prosecutorial power, which is why they created the non-hearsay
requirement. 56 In order to avoid the slippery slope of baseless
prosecutions, it is crucial to forbid hearsay allegations in accusatory
instruments. 57
In In re Neftali D., 58 the New York Court of Appeals compared
the requirements for an accusatory instrument to the requirements for
a juvenile delinquency petition under the Family Court Act. 59 The
court stated, “The sufficiency requirements . . . are not simply
technical pleading requirements but are designed to ensure substantive
due process protection.” 60 The court reasoned that a juvenile
delinquency petition, like an accusatory instrument, is the sole
instrument for which someone could be “arrested and deprived of
liberty.” 61 Thus, it is of utmost importance that both documents
51

Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d at 73 (stating that a misdemeanor complaint differs from a felony
complaint in that the felony complaint would be “followed by preliminary hearing and a Grand
Jury proceeding”).
52 Id. at 73-74; see Goode, supra note 35 (stating that only approximately 6% of state
criminal cases actually go to trial because the majority of criminal defendants will take a plea
deal).
53 People v. Phillipe, 538 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403-04 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1989).
54 Rizzo, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
55 Phillipe, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
56 See Monero, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (“CPL [§] 100.15 and [§] 100.40 require the People to
file an accusatory instrument based on nonhearsay evidence. The purpose of this requirement
is to prevent the People from bringing baseless prosecutions.”).
57 Id.
58 651 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1995).
59 Id. at 871.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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comply with statutory requirements. 62 The New York Court of
Appeals recognized the dangers of statutory non-compliance. 63 If
prosecutors neglect to follow the CPL, there could be chaos in the
number of people arrested and prosecuted based on unreliable hearsay
rather than solid factual allegations. 64 Thus, hearsay exceptions should
never be permitted in accusatory instruments.
III.

HEARSAY

Hearsay is “an out-of-court 65 statement 66 offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted 67 therein.” 68 The rule against hearsay was
created out of “[d]istrust of jurors and their ability to appropriately
weigh the credibility of a witness’s trial testimony recounting someone
else’s statement.” 69
The United States Supreme Court recognized three reasons for
excluding hearsay. 70 First, the Court reasoned that the witness must
physically take the stand under oath in order to understand the
seriousness of his statements. 71 If a witness falsely testified as to
someone else’s knowledge, it would be difficult for the prosecution to
bring forth perjury charges. 72 Second, the witness has to be present in
order to be cross-examined, which is the most effective method for
assessing truth. 73
Cross-examination measures credibility by
“explor[ing] weaknesses in a declarant’s memory, perception,
62

Id.
In re Neftali D., 651 N.E.2d at 871-72.
64 See id. (holding that a juvenile delinquency petition, like an accusatory instrument, must
comport with statutory requirements because it is the sole instrument needed to arrest someone
and deprive him of his liberty); See also People v. Zambounis, 167 N.E. 183, 184 (N.Y. 1929)
(“Forms and procedure still have their place and purpose in the administration of the law;
without them we would have chaos.”).
65 An out-of-court statement is one that “the declarant does not make while testifying at the
current trial or hearing.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(1).
66 A statement is “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct” so long
as the person intended to communicate something. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
67 An out-of-court statement will only be hearsay if it is offered “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
68 Stern v. Waldbaum, 651 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1996).
69 Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against
Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717, 718 (2015).
70 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
71 Id.
72 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913).
73 California, 399 U.S. at 158.
63
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narrative ability, and sincerity.” 74 The Court, lastly, recognized that
hearsay must be excluded because it is crucial for the jury to observe
the witness’s demeanor on the stand in order to evaluate his or her
credibility. 75 Thus, for the reasons outlined by the Supreme Court,
hearsay is impermissible as evidence. 76
A. Hearsay Exceptions
Although hearsay is impermissible as evidence, several hearsay
exceptions were developed because “some out-of-court statements
were thought to contain sufficient indicia of reliability to deem them
worthy of admission into evidence.” 77 In order for an out-of-court
statement to be admitted into evidence, it must not only fall within a
hearsay exception but also be proven to be reliable by the
prosecution. 78 The Federal Rules of Evidence outlines thirty-two
exceptions and exclusions to the hearsay rule. 79 These exceptions stem
from necessity80 and were created for jury trials. 81 The two relevant
hearsay exceptions that will be addressed in this Note are the present
sense impression and the excited utterance. 82
1. Present Sense Impression
The present sense impression allows the trier of fact to hear
hearsay testimony of “[a] statement describing or explaining an event
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived
it.” 83 A statement made while or immediately after an event occurred
is theoretically reliable because the statement and the event take place

74

Park, supra note 33, at 55.
California, 399 U.S. at 158.
76 Id.
77 Williams, supra note 69, at 720.
78 People v. Brensic, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (N.Y. 1987).
79 FED. R. EVID. 801-804. New York has not codified its own rules of evidence, but
acknowledges both the excited utterance and the present sense impression as exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. 1993) (recognizing the present
sense impression as a New York hearsay exception); see People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229,
1231 (N.Y. 1979) (recognizing the excited utterance hearsay exception).
80 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968).
81 See Williams, supra note 69, at 728.
82 FED. R. EVID. 803.
83 FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
75
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at practically the same time, leaving no time for reflection. 84 An
example of a present sense impression would be a neighbor calling the
police to report a break-in across the street while describing the
burglar’s appearance and actions. 85 In People v. Brown, 86 the New
York Court of Appeals held that present sense impressions may be
admissible as long as the declarant’s statements were sufficiently
corroborated. 87 However, the court did not definitively state how
much corroboration would be required. 88 In this particular case, the
court decided the police’s arrival at the scene shortly thereafter was
sufficient corroboration because the officers observed the people and
the atmosphere described by the neighbor. 89
2. Excited Utterance
An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement that it caused.” 90 The exception may be admissible if: “(1)
the statement was made contemporaneously or immediately after a
startling or upsetting event; [and] (2) the declarant was under the stress
of excitement, or shock, or trauma at the time the utterance was made,
and before the declarant had the opportunity to reflect and fabricate.” 91
Excited utterances are admissible under the theory that “the excitement
flows from the event,” thereby making the utterance part of the event
itself. 92
In assessing whether a statement should be admitted as an
excited utterance, the court factors “the nature of the event, the amount
of time which elapsed between the occurrence and the statement, and

84

People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 371-72 (N.Y. 1993).
See id. at 371.
86 610 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a 911 call describing a burglary, including the
perpetrators’ descriptions and actions was admitted into evidence as present sense impression).
87 Id. at 374.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
91 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1998) (citing People v. Vasquez,
670 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1996), People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1987), People v.
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y. 1986), People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y.
1979), People v. Simms, 665 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1997), People v. Van Patten,
509 N.Y.S.2d 926 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1986), People v. Egan, 434 N.Y.S.2d 55 (App. Div.
4th Dep’t 1980)).
92 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 168–69.
85
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the activities of the declarant in the interim to ascertain if there was
significant opportunity to deviate from the truth.” 93
In Swinger, the responding officer arrived within one minute of
receiving the 911 call while “the dispute was still in progress.” 94 The
officer heard a verbal altercation and witnessed the complainant crying
while hiding on the floor behind the couch. 95 She had bruises on her
face and told the officer in a distressed tone that her husband beat her. 96
The woman later recanted her statement and refused to press charges
against her husband. 97 Nevertheless, the court held that the woman’s
statement to the officer was an excited utterance and permitted it in the
accusatory instrument as an exception to the hearsay rule. 98 The court
reasoned that the victim in this case was a battered woman who was
traumatically beaten by her husband. 99 The officer arrived in the
middle of the event while the woman was “cowering in fear.” 100 The
court concluded that the statement qualified as an excited utterance
because “the statement was made spontaneously, under the stress of a
startling event,” thereby leaving no time for reflection or fabrication. 101
Similarly, in Foster, the officer arrived at the scene within five
minutes of receiving the 911 call. 102 The complainant, while “sweating
and in an excited state,” asserted that he was stabbed in the head with
a screwdriver by the defendant. 103 The court reasoned that the
complainant’s statement to the officer constituted an excited utterance
because “[a] gash to the head caused by being stabbed in the head by
a hard sharp metal object such as a screwdriver is an injury that would
be startling and upsetting to any reasonable person.” 104
On the contrary, in People v. Heinitz, 105 the officer arrived
within five minutes of receiving the 911 call and observed the victim
93 People v. Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997) (citing People v.
Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Brown, 517 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1987);
People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109 (N.Y. 1986)).
94 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 341.
99 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 People v. Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2008).
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crying while touching her crooked nose, which had a dark mark on
it. 106 The victim stated that the defendant head-butted her. 107 The court
held this statement did not qualify as an excited utterance because,
although the victim was crying and sniffling, she was “not yelling,
screaming, or visibly disturbed in any other way.” 108 The court
reasoned, “[w]hen the injuries suffered by a complainant are
considerably less severe, as is the case here, the complainant’s reaction
and emotional and physical states must be proportionately higher in
order to meet the threshold of an excited utterance standard.” 109 The
complainant in this case kept touching her nose and asking the officer
if it was broken. 110 The court reasoned that “the fact that the
complainant was ‘aware of her injury’ . . . belies the reasoning behind,
and the need for, the excited utterance doctrine.” 111 The court
concluded that if a declarant is having rational thoughts she could not
possibly be in a traumatic enough state to declare an excited
utterance. 112
Courts have differed on the standard for what should constitute
an excited utterance. 113 Some courts focus on the amount of time
elapsed between receiving the 911 call and an officer arriving on the
scene. 114 Other courts focus on the state of mind of the victim and the
severity of his or her injuries. 115 Overall, the test for whether a
statement qualifies as an excited utterance is subjective. 116 A judge
does not have the medical training to understand whether an injury or
106

Id. at 2.
Id.
108 Id. at 3; Cf. People v. Mitchell, 849 N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2007)
(holding that the complainant’s statements were excited utterances because she was
“screaming,” “hysterical,” and “gasping for air”).
109 Heinitz, 2008 WL 756131 at *3.
110 Id. at *2.
111 Id. at *3.
112 Id.
113 Compare Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905 (considering “the surrounding facts and
circumstances, the additional information in the second superseding instrument, the
complainant’s appearance, the severity of her injuries, the amount of time elapsed since the
incident, and the content of the statement itself”), with Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571
(considering only whether the declarant was under the stress of the startling event when she
spoke).
114 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (holding that the exception should apply if there is a
one-minute elapse of time); see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (holding that the exception should
only apply if the elapse of time is within five minutes).
115 See Heinitz, 859 N.Y.S.2d 905; see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
116 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
107
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situation is traumatic enough to bring about an excited utterance or
whether a victim’s reaction to being injured is an appropriate response.
The judge’s perception of the incident may not be accurate, yet he or
she has broad discretion in choosing whether to admit the statement.117
Thus, excited utterances should never be permitted in accusatory
instruments as the sole form of evidence against someone.
B. DA’s Rationale for Using Hearsay Exceptions in
Accusatory Instruments
Although hearsay is not permitted in accusatory instruments,
prosecutors have offered several justifications for using hearsay
exceptions. 118 First, prosecutors have argued that hearsay exceptions
are permitted at trial, where the standard of proof is higher than at the
pleading stage. 119 Thus, the exceptions should be permitted in the
accusatory instrument because there is a lower threshold of proof. 120
The problem with the DA’s reasoning is there is a ninety percent
chance the case will not go to trial. 121 If the case never goes to trial,
then the defendant would be prosecuted based on a statement that may
not be accurate and cannot be challenged through trial proceedings,
such as cross-examination. 122 Second, prosecutors have argued that
they should be able to use hearsay exceptions in accusatory
instruments because other courts have permitted them. 123 Other states
also permit hearsay exceptions at trial regardless of the availability of
117

See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972).
119 People v. Fields, 344 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1973) (“[Hearsay]
exceptions must be authorized implicitly in the Criminal Procedure Law or we have the absurd
result that the rules for making an information are more stringent than those applicable to
criminal trials and hearings. In the light of the historical case background and the absurdity
of any other construction, we must construe Hearsay as used in the Criminal Procedure Law
to mean hearsay which is not admissible on the trial.”).
120 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *2.
121 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1997).
122 See Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in New
York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 179 (2002)
(stating that in cases where hearsay is admitted as the sole form of evidence, defendants have
“little or no opportunity to cross-examine the complainant, the heart of the prosecution’s case.
The majority of domestic violence trials involve ‘what happened’ defenses, which may depend
largely on the strength of the complainant’s credibility against assertions of grudges, selfinterests, jealousies, and other biases or motives for fabrication.”).
123 See Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *3; Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 572; Swinger, 689
N.Y.S.2d at 341.
118
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the declarant. 124 Lastly, prosecutors have justified the use of hearsay
exceptions because sometimes hearsay is the only evidence in a
case. 125
C. Reliability of Excited Utterances and Present Sense
Impressions
Hearsay exceptions will only be admitted if they are proven to
be reliable. 126 Reliability is the sum of the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement that render the declarant worthy of
belief. 127 After taking all of the surrounding circumstances into
consideration, the statement, made under those surrounding
conditions, should appear to be highly truthful. 128 The time frame as
to when the statement was made is an important factor in a court’s
analysis. 129 Most courts have deemed statements made only a few
minutes after the incident as reliable. 130 Their reasoning is that if the
statement was made quickly, it was spontaneous and leaves little time
for fabrication. 131 However, some courts have permitted excited
utterances that were made up to two and a half hours after the

124

King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (statements to girlfriend
confessing to murder were admitted as an excited utterance); People v. Hughey, 194 Cal. App.
3d 1383, 1387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (declarant present at trial but did not testify); People v.
Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d 653, 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (statements by murder victim were
admitted as hearsay exceptions).
125 Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge Of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 692 (1993)
(discussing how hearsay exceptions may be the only form of evidence in a child abuse case
where the child may not take the stand because it is too traumatic).
126 Brensic, 509 N.E.2d at 1228.
127 Nucci v. Proper, 744 N.E.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. 2001) (“Relevant factors include
‘spontaneity, repetition, the mental state of the declarant, absence of motive to fabricate,
unlikelihood of faulty recollection and the degree to which the statement was against the
declarant’s . . . interest.’ Courts have also ‘considered the status or relationship to the declarant
of the person to whom the statement was made . . ., whether there was a coercive atmosphere,
whether it was made in response to questioning and whether the statements reflect an attempt
to shift blame or curry favor.’”) (quoting People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1066 (N.Y.
1999)).
128 Solomon, 2002 WL 32157170 at *2.
129 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 338; see Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
130 See id.
131 Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341; Foster, 740 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
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incident. 132
This line of reasoning directly contradicts the
“spontaneity” requirement. 133
In People v. Cotto, 134 the victim, while in an ambulance after
being shot, named Richie Cotto as his shooter. 135 Although there was
a gap in time and the declaration was in response to probing questions,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the statement was admissible
as an excited utterance. 136 The court reasoned that “[w]hile it is critical
that statements be made before a declarant had an opportunity to
reflect, the relevant time period ‘is not measured in minutes or
seconds’ but rather ‘is measured by facts.’” 137 The court decided that
the victim’s “shock and trauma never subsided,” which eliminated his
ability to reflect, thereby rendering his statements reliable. 138 Contrary
to the majority’s reasoning, the victim was not in shock, but was
“conscious and lucid.” 139 The victim also clearly did not make any
spontaneous declarations. 140 Instead, he intentionally declined to name
his shooter and only mentioned Richie after continuous probing and
prodding by both the officer and the emergency medical technician,
who told him that he was probably going to die. 141 A statement that
was “made in response to suggestive comments and questioning . . .
lack[s] the inherent reliability of an excited utterance.” 142 While a
gunshot wound is certainly traumatic, “there is no presumption that a
statement” made after such an event necessarily qualifies as an excited
utterance. 143 The victim “reflected upon his answers, deliberated
before responding, and weighed his responses accordingly,” which
demonstrates that he was not in an excited state. 144
132

People v. Brooks, 522 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (N.Y. 1988); see also Brown, 517 N.E.2d at
515 (holding that a statement made 30 minutes after the incident is sufficient in time to permit
the hearsay exception).
133 Nucci, 744 N.E.2d at 131.
134 699 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1998).
135 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 400.
137 Id. at 399 (quoting Vasquez, 670 N.E.2d at 1328).
138 Id. at 400.
139 Id. at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting).
140 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting).
141 Id.
142 People v. Fenner, 727 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2001); see also Elizabeth
F. Lofus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 48, 518-37 (1993)
(describing how “new, postevent information often becomes incorporated into memory,
supplementing and altering a person’s recollection.”).
143 Cotto, 699 N.E.2d at 406 (Smith, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Even if an excited utterance was made shortly after the
incident, that still does not mean it was reliable. 145 A person could
craft a lie in merely two seconds. 146 In addition, the accepted short
time period does not necessarily comport with the psychology of a
victim. 147 Many victims feel ashamed and tend to withdraw. 148 Thus,
it is unlikely for a victim to immediately come forward with an
accurate tale as to what happened. 149 Further, the short time frame is
also unreliable because victims may initially suppress unwanted or
unpleasant memories, which may not return to their consciousness
until a later time. 150
The excited utterance doctrine focuses on the sincerity of the
statement, but does not factor into account any mistakes based on
perception and memory. 151 The complex cognitive processes that
occur in the brain play tricks on one’s senses, especially vision and
hearing. 152 Perception and memory are matters of “reconstruction”
rather than a playback of what actually occurred. 153 Thus, it is
incredibly plausible and common for people to make honest errors
about what they saw or heard. 154 In addition, “entire events that never
happened can be injected into memory.” 155 Psychology experiments
have shown that people can make up false memories of witnessing an
145

Orenstein, supra note 33, at 179.
Orenstein, supra note 33, at 178 (citing Goldman, supra note 33, at 460 (“[T]he hearsay
statement would have to be spoken virtually simultaneously with the described event for even
the slightest assurance of increased reliability.”)).
147 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 180.
148 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 204.
149 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 204; see also Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five
Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV.
981, 1033-34 (2008) (discussing how New York does not have a statute of limitations for rape
because the legislators understand that many victims take time to come forward).
150 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37.
151 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 179.
152 See Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People During a
Real-World Interaction, PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW 5(4), 644 (1998) (describing
“change blindness,” a phenomenon in which observers fail to notice substantial changes
happening right in front of their eyes).
153 Brady Wagoner, Barlett’s Concept of Schema in Reconstruction, THEORY &
PSYCHOLOGY 23(5), 562 (2013).
154 Id. at 562.
155 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37 (1993) (describing “the case of Paul Ingram,” who was
falsely accused of participating “in a Satan-worshipping cult alleged to have murdered 25
babies.” Ingram, who was completely innocent, was pressed to remember what he had done
and “developed detailed memories and wrote a three-page statement confessing in graphic
detail” to a crime he never committed).
146
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assault. 156 For this reason, hearsay exceptions should never be
permitted in accusatory instruments because the witness could simply
be mistaken about what he heard or saw. 157
Furthermore, psychological scholars do not condone the
concept that the stress of an event will produce an accurate account of
the incident. 158 To be sure, the extreme stress and strong feelings
evoked by such an event will heavily interfere with one’s perception
and memory. 159 Therefore, excited utterances and present sense
impressions are inherently unreliable and should not be used in
accusatory instruments.
D. Credibility of Hearsay Declarants
When choosing to admit a hearsay exception into evidence,
courts do not consider the credibility of the hearsay declarant. 160
Instead, courts use a “trauma trumping approach” where the deciding
factor in admitting a statement is whether the declarant was reacting to
a stressful situation. 161 This approach to admitting hearsay is alarming
because the declarant could despise the defendant and lie simply to
have the defendant arrested and charged with a crime. 162 For example,
a woman could call the police screaming and crying that her exhusband hit her when she actually lied in hopes that she would get full
custody of their children. Suppose the woman later recants her
statement and refuses to sign a supporting deposition. A police officer
or an ADA could still use the statement as an excited utterance 163 in
order to prosecute the husband for assault. Nonetheless, courts do not

156 Lofus, supra note 142, at 518-37 (1993) (describing an experiment in which “children
aged four to seven years were led to believe that they saw a man hit a girl, when he had not,
after hearing the girl lie about the assault. Not only did they misrecall the nonexistent hitting,
but they added their own details . . . .”).
157 See Wagoner, supra note 153, at 562.
158 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 181.
159 Orenstein, supra note 33, at 181.
160 A declarant is “the person who made the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(b); see People
v. Fratello, 706 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1998).
161 Steven Zeidman, Who Needs an Evidence Code?: The New York Court of Appeals’
Radical Reevaluation of Hearsay, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 211, 220 (1999).
162 See Holland, supra note 122, at 182.
163 The statement would qualify as an excited utterance because it was made after a startling
event and the woman was under stress when she spoke. See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
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take bias into consideration in choosing whether to admit the
statement. 164
In People v. Lopez, 165 a woman who was beaten in her
apartment made statements to police, which were admitted into
evidence at trial as hearsay exceptions. 166 The court chose to admit the
statements because “[t]he surrounding circumstances establish that
they were made ‘under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of
the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of selfinterest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned
reflection.’” 167 The problem with the court’s “trauma-trumping
approach” is that it weighs the essence of the terrible ordeal more
heavily than any other factor, if it even considers any other factors. 168
Therefore, through the court’s eyes, as long as the declarant was
reacting to a stressful circumstance, other factors, such as a motive to
lie, may not even be taken into consideration. 169 In
People
v.
170
Simpson, a woman was accosted by the defendant, who stole her
engagement ring and allegedly sexually assaulted her in an alley. 171
The woman told the defendant that she would give him money to stop
bothering her. 172 As the two were walking back to her apartment to
get the money, she yelled out to two friends for help and the defendant
began to flee. 173 She and her friends started to chase the man, but then
she went back to her apartment to call 911. 174 She told the police that
the man had a gun even though he actually only had a box cutter.175
She admitted that she lied because she thought it would make the
police come faster. 176 Nevertheless, the court admitted the recording
of the 911 call into evidence as an excited utterance. 177
The court reasoned that the content of the call showed that the
woman was still under the stress of the event, which made the tape
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176.
728 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2001).
Id. at 146.
Id. (quoting Brown, 517 N.E.2d at 515).
Zeidman, supra note 161, at 220.
Holland, supra note 122, at 177.
656 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997).
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
Id. at 766-67.
Id. at 767.
Id.
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admissible despite the self-confessed lie. 178
The majority
acknowledged, but disregarded the fact that “an excited utterance must
lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrication.” 179 The entire
theory behind the excited utterance doctrine is that the statement was
made spontaneously without “studied reflection,” which could
motivate the declarant to lie. 180 The court clearly erred in admitting
the tape as an excited utterance because the declarant, by confessing
her lie, demonstrated that she had enough time to reflect upon the
incident to craft a lie. 181 The majority simply ignored the lie, which
undermines the definition of an excited utterance. 182 This reasoning
clearly demonstrates why excited utterances should never be used in
accusatory instruments; someone could blatantly lie about an incident,
yet a defendant could and would likely be prosecuted based solely on
that false statement.
In People v. Fratello, 183 Guy Peduto was shot during a 2:00
a.m. high-speed car chase in the Bronx. 184 Peduto told a passerby and
an officer that the defendant was the person who shot him. 185 Those
statements were admitted into evidence as excited utterances. 186
Peduto later recanted those statements in an affidavit and was called as
a witness for the defense at trial. 187 On the stand, Peduto explained his
long-standing friendship with the defendant. 188 He also described in
detail the man who actually shot him. 189 Peduto originally lied because
he was biased against the defendant and feared retaliation for an
unrelated incident. 190 The court admitted the statements despite the
bias because it concluded that the bias merely serves “as a basis for
impeachment of the declaration.” 191 The problem with the court’s
reasoning is that, unlike in this case, a hearsay declarant might not
178

Id.
Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (Joy, J., dissenting).
180 Edwards, 392 N.E.2d at 1231.
181 See Swinger, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 341 (concluding that a key factor in admitting an excited
utterance is that there must not have been time for reflection or fabrication).
182 Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
183 706 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1998).
184 Id. at 1174.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1175.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 1176.
191 Id.
179
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testify. 192 In order to impeach a witness, a lawyer must ask the witness
a series of questions to lay the foundation for the contradiction. 193 If
the declarant does not take the stand, it would be impossible to lay the
foundation for impeachment. 194 Thus, it is irrelevant to the court
whether the declarant had a motive to lie to frame someone for a crime
he did not commit. 195
The defense argued that the excited utterances should not have
been admitted into evidence for two reasons. 196 First, in order for an
excited utterance to be admitted, the declarant must have been able to
observe what he claimed happened. 197 The defense argued that Peduto
could not have possibly recognized the defendant as his attacker during
the nighttime high-speed chase, and the court erred in refusing to allow
expert testimony on the issue. 198 Second, the defense argued, “the
prosecution’s entire case was based upon Peduto’s spontaneous
declarations,” even though his testimony at trial completely
contradicted those statements. 199 If all the evidence in a case comes
from one witness whose testimony is both inculpating and exculpating,
the jury can only decide the case based on impermissible speculation,
which would require the court to dismiss the charges. 200 The court,
however, rejected the per se dismissal rule and decided that a jury
should be allowed to draw whatever permissible inferences it so
chooses, as the jurors have a rational basis for resolving the conflicting
testimony. 201 The dissent opined that a repudiated statement should
not be “used as the sole basis for a conviction.” 202 In this case, there
needed to be some corroborating evidence in order “to find the

192

See Lopez, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
People v. Wise, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (N.Y. 1978) (“To set the stage for the prior
inconsistency, the questioner must first inform the witness of the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement, and inquire of him whether he in fact made it.”).
194 Sloan v. N. Y. Cen. R. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 125, 127 (1871) (“To lay the foundation for
contradiction, it is necessary to ask the witness specifically whether he has made such
statements.”).
195 Contra People v. Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d 802, 808 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (“[I]t is
vitally important to consider whether [declarant] had, in addition to an opportunity to reflect,
a reason to fabricate a story implicating defendant.”).
196 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176.
197 Id. at 1175.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1176.
200 Id. at 1177.
201 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1177.
202 Id. at 1179 (Smith, J., dissenting).
193
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 203 The judge had no
basis to conclude that the defendant was guilty based on the
contradictory testimony of only one witness. 204
Fratello exemplifies how dangerous admitting an excited
utterance can be. In this case, the excited utterance was the only
evidence against the defendant even though the hearsay declarant’s
testimony lacked any credibility. 205 This case shows that one can lie,
admit to lying, and even explain his motive for lying, but the court
would still admit the original fabricated statement simply because the
declarant was under stress when he spoke. 206 This case should have
been dismissed; 207 it would be impossible to find someone guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt if the sole form of evidence stems from an
undependable and contradictory hearsay declarant. 208
Simpson and Fratello have proven that the credibility of the
declarant is not taken into consideration when admitting a hearsay
exception into evidence. 209 Sometimes these statements are the only
form of evidence in the prosecution’s case. 210 Prosecutors weigh the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases and offer plea deals
accordingly. 211 However, prosecutors may be less inclined to enter
into plea discussions or dismiss a case because they know that the

203 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Holland, supra note 122, at 182 (warning that without
any other corroborating evidence, such as physical injury, a statement may be admitted
“simply because the complainant said it,” and that statement could serve as the only form of
evidence against the defendant).
204 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1179 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Jackson, 480
N.E.2d 727, 732 (N.Y. 1985)); see also People v. Stewart, 358 N.E.2d 487, 492-93 (N.Y.
1976) (“Here all the evidence on this point came from a single prosecution witness who offered
irreconcilable testimony pointing in both directions to guilt and innocence on the homicide
charge. There was then no basis for the jury to find that the injury inflicted by the defendant
caused the death of Daniel Smith, beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
205 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176.
206 Id. at 1174-76.
207 See Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1990) (holding excited utterances
cannot be admitted where a declarant “clearly had a motive—revenge—to fabricate his initial
statements”).
208 See Jackson, 480 N.E.2d at 732 (“When all of the evidence of guilt comes from a single
prosecution witness who gives irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence,
the jury is left without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of
either.”); see also Norton, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (“There is a significant probability that the
jury would have made a different finding but for the erroneous admission of the hearsay
testimony.”).
209 Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176; Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
210 See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1176.
211 Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 124.
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witness’s credibility will not affect their case. 212 Because the District
Attorney’s office does not have to factor the witness’s credibility into
account, ADAs do not have to screen out these weaker cases. 213 This
could result in a heavy court calendar full of baseless prosecutions. 214
Thus, hearsay statements should have to be proven as reliable and
credible because once they are admitted, they will not only burden the
court’s time, but could also deprive a defendant of his or her
freedom. 215
IV.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Hearsay evidence arguably violates an accused’s right “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him” 216 because the hearsay
declarant will never be subject to cross-examination. 217 In Crawford
v. Washington, 218 the Supreme Court held that extrajudicial statements,
which are testimonial in nature, are barred under the Confrontation
Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 219 The Court relied on
long-standing precedent, which held that ex parte depositions and
affidavits presented at trial deprive the accused of his constitutional
right to confront his accuser face-to-face. 220
Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 221 however, disregards the
unavailability requirement that has been outlined by the Supreme

212

See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 121, at 124.
See Holland, supra note 122, at 179-80.
214 See discussion supra Section III.
215 See discussion supra Section III.
216 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. New York’s Constitution has an identical provision stating
“[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend
in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §
6. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The right to confront one’s
accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman times.”).
217 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (“The main and essential purpose of
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.”).
218 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
219 Id. at 53-54, 68 (reasoning that the Framers must have based the Sixth Amendment on
English common law, which “conditioned admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine”).
220 Id. at 57 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47
(1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)).
221 FED. R. EVID. 803.
213

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/21

22

Laterza: Hearsay Exceptions in Accusatory Instruments

2017

HEARSAY IN ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS

1239

Court for hearsay declarants. 222 As previously stated, hearsay
exceptions stem from necessity. 223 Thus, when there is an available
complaining witness, it is not necessary for a police officer or an ADA
to sign a supporting deposition justified by hearsay exceptions. 224 The
complainants in Solomon, Swinger, Foster, and Rasoully were not
unavailable, but simply chose not to sign supporting depositions.225
Allowing unnecessary hearsay exceptions in an accusatory instrument
implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the
available witnesses against him. 226
Although this constitutional protection generally applies
during a trial, the Confrontation Clause should extend to the pleading
stage because an accusatory instrument is the sole document needed to
prosecute someone for a misdemeanor. 227 Approximately ninety-four
percent of misdemeanor cases are disposed of via plea-bargaining;
therefore, there is a strong chance the case may never go to trial. 228
Even if the case does go to trial, the defendant will not be able to
confront his accuser face-to-face. 229 Instead, he will only be able to
confront a police officer or an ADA, who will simply reiterate hearsay
declarations because neither of them actually witnessed the incident. 230
222 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; California, 399 U.S. at 186 (“What I would hold binding on
the States as a matter of due process is what I also deem the correct meaning of the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause—that a State may not in a criminal case use hearsay when
the declarant is available.”).
223 Barber, 390 U.S. at 722; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“The Confrontation
Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in
conformance with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior crossexamination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”).
224 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (“If the declarant is available and
the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with
full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little
justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation
Clause analysis, favor the better evidence.”); see Brown, 610 N.E.2d at 374 (“If such an
eyewitness is available to testify to the events, there is certainly no pressing need for the
hearsay testimony.”).
225 See discussion supra Section I.
226 See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text.
228 Goode, supra note 35.
229 See Lopez, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46 (stating that the complainant did not testify at trial,
but her “statements in the apartment to a police officer were admitted over defendant’s hearsay
objection”).
230 See id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 21

1240

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

Thus, a police officer or an ADA should not be allowed to sign a
supporting deposition in lieu of the actual complaining witness’s
supporting deposition because the Supreme Court has established that
hearsay exceptions should only be used when necessary, meaning the
declarant must be unavailable. 231
V.

SOLUTIONS
A. Advice for Defense Attorneys

When hearsay exceptions are used in accusatory instruments,
defense attorneys must address it or the objection will be waived. 232 In
order to preserve the issue for appeal, defense attorneys must write a
motion to dismiss based on facial insufficiency or object to the
pleading defect on the record at the next relevant court date. 233 The
facial insufficiency motion should attack each element of the crime
charged. Defense attorneys should argue that each element of the
crime has not been established by non-hearsay, factual allegations as
required by the CPL. 234 In addition, the hearsay exceptions themselves
should be attacked as not rising to the level of an excited utterance or
a present sense impression. 235
B. Guidance for the Court
If the court deems it necessary to admit hearsay exceptions in
accusatory instruments, certain safeguards should be in place. First, in
order to admit an exited utterance, there should be some form of
corroborating evidence to ensure the statement is valid. 236
Corroborating evidence will protect defendants from hearsay
declarants who are not credible, or declarants who are plainly lying
231

See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
Casey, 740 N.E.2d at 241 (“[H]earsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local
criminal court information must be preserved in order to be reviewable as a matter of law on
appeal. Because defendant failed to interpose a timely objection or motion before the trial
court which addressed the hearsay defect in the misdemeanor information in this case, we are
precluded from considering it.”).
233 Id.
234 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40(1)(c) (McKinney 1972).
235 See discussion supra Section III.
236 See Fratello, 706 N.E.2d at 1179-80 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that corroborating
evidence should be required for excited utterances just as it is required for present sense
impressions).
232
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about the incident, because it will provide independent evidence aside
from the statement itself. 237 Second, hearsay exceptions should be
admitted if the defendant is truly unavailable, not merely choosing to
recant his or her statement. 238 Third, New York should implement a
rule pertaining to the impeachment of a non-testifying hearsay
declarant because it would safeguard the defendant against a biased
declarant as well as provide Confrontation Clause protection. 239 New
York courts should allow the testimony of rebuttal witnesses who can
impeach a hearsay declarant by prior inconsistent statements. 240
VI.

CONCLUSION

New York trial courts have begun a trend of holding accusatory
instruments facially sufficient, without a complainant’s supporting
deposition. 241 Those accusatory instruments contained depositions of
officers and ADAs using hearsay exceptions, such as excited
utterances and present sense impressions, to relay statements made to
them by the true complainants. 242 This trend needs to end and should
not be permitted for several reasons.
First, permitting the use of hearsay in an accusatory instrument
violates the rule against hearsay stated in the CPL. 243 Second, the
declarant may be biased or not credible. 244 Third, permitting hearsay
exceptions in accusatory instruments arguably violates a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. 245 Lastly and most
237

See id.; see also supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Section IV.
239 See FED. R. EVID. 806 (“When a hearsay statement—or a statement described in Rule
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)––has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be
attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if
the declarant had testified as a witness. The court may admit evidence of the declarant’s
inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant had
an opportunity to explain or deny it. If the party against whom the statement was admitted
calls the declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on
cross-examination.”); see also People v. Devalle, 670 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
1998) (admitting “a prior inconsistent statement to impeach” a non-testifying hearsay
declarant and holding “‘if there was never any opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the
inconsistent statement may be shown without a foundation.’”).
240 Id.
241 See discussion supra Section I.
242 See discussion supra Section I.
243 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35(1)(a) (McKinney 1972).
244 See discussion supra Section III.
245 See discussion supra Section IV.
238
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importantly, without any other safeguards, a defendant may be
prosecuted and deprived of liberty based solely on a hearsay statement,
which may not be accurate or reliable. 246
In order to preserve this issue for appeal, defense attorneys
must address the pleading defect in a motion or on the record in
court. 247 To minimize the unreliability of hearsay exceptions, New
York courts should require corroborating evidence and should permit
hearsay declarants to be impeached by prior inconsistent statements.248
In conclusion, hearsay exceptions should not be permitted in
accusatory instruments as the sole form of evidence against a
defendant because it violates the CPL and unfairly prejudices a
defendant in that he or she may be prosecuted based solely on hearsay
exceptions, instead of concrete facts. 249

246
247
248
249

See discussion supra Section III.
See discussion supra Section V.
See discussion supra Section V.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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